Abstract
Conciliatory views of disagreement are an intuitive class of views on the epistemic significance of disagreement. Such views claim that making conciliation is often required upon discovering that another disagrees with you. One of the chief objections to these views of the epistemic significance of disagreement is that they are self-defeating. Since, there are disagreements about the epistemic significance of disagreement, such views can be turned on themselves, and this has been thought to be problematic. In this paper, I examine several different incarnations of this objection and defend conciliatory views of disagreement from each of them, while making a modification regarding how such views should be understood.
| Original language | American English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 145-159 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Social Epistemology |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 3 2015 |
Keywords
- Defeat
- Disagreement
- Evidentialism
- Justification