Convergence or Divergence in Final-Offer Arbitration in Professional Baseball

B. Jay Coleman, Kenneth M. Jennings, Frank S. Mclaughlin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Many labor relations practitioners and theorists believe that final-offer arbitration by a neutral third party encourages union and management officials to resolve their bargaining differences. However, decision scientists have found that there is no median convergence between the parties. Using professional baseball in our model, we test the assumption that major league owners tend to maximize expected monetary value (EMV), finding that claims of divergence are invalidated in dispute management contexts where there is a broad range of other motivations for settling. Decision models offer even further support for the use of final-offer arbitration in such settings.
Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)238-247
Number of pages10
JournalIndustrial Relations
Volume32
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 3 1993

Keywords

  • industrial big data
  • Labor arbitration
  • Labor disputes
  • Proactive Monitoring
  • Sports arbitration baseball

Disciplines

  • Economics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Business Administration, Management, and Operations
  • Law
  • Public Relations and Advertising
  • Labor Economics

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